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matters of utmost importance in such fields as Labour Relations and
Immigration Proceedings. In addition, appeals to the Supreme Court
of Canada involve considerable additional expense to the parties con-
cerned.
Finally, it is suggested that the extension of the jurisdiction
of the Exchequer Court would tend to multiply and duplicate the
jurisdiction, exactly what the British North America Act sought to
avoid. This theory of a simplified court structure is a sound and
enviable one and should not be destroyed. However, in 1867 the
economic machinery was much less complex than it is today. It is to
cope with this complexity that the federal government has seen fit to
create the many tribunals and administrative agencies which exist
today. If our complicated economy requires a minor duplication
of courts to cope with its problems, then the advantages of their
duplication far outweighs the disadvantages. It is submitted then,
that the present system although it may be constitutionally 24 valid,
it does not afford the uniform protection required.
PETER CATHCARTO
CANADA TRUST v. LABADIE--GIFTS---DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA-STATE
OF M1MN OF DONER-Upon first reading, Canada Trust Co., v., babadiel
a recent decisiorl of the Ontario Court of Appeal, seems to depart
from the general principles of the law of valid donatio mortis causa
as laid down in their classic form in Cain v. Moon.2 Specifically,
this impression is created by Mr. Justice Roach's statement that:
It is impossible on the evidence to hold that at the various times when he
delivered possession to the respondent he was by reason of his then
physical condition, and the surrounding circumstances, in extremis.
Such a condition is an essential to a valid donatio mortis causa... 3
The classic statement of Lord Russell in Cain v. Moon is as
follows:
It is further conceded that for an effectual donatio mortis causa three
things must combine: first, the gift or donation must have been made in
contemplation, though not necessarily in expectation, of death; secondly,
there must have been delivery to the donee of the subject-matter of the
gift; and thirdly, the gift must be made under such circumstances as
show that the thing is to revert to the donor in case he should
recover.4
2 4 0ne additional problem that arises out of the Vantel decision, is that
once assuming the jurisdictional procedure problem, by what means Is the
court to determine whether or not the Board has acted fairly? In other
words, since the provincial court has assumed jurisdiction, does it follow
that it can then proceed to apply its own substantive rule of natural justice?
It may be that with the enactment of the federal Bill of Rights, the provincial
court should apply it to the question of whether the court has acted fairly,
which of course is the essential nature of prerogative remedies. On the other
hand, there may not be any practical difference at all as to which rule the
court applies.
*MAr. Cathcart is in the third year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [1962] O.R. 151; 31 D.L.R. (2d) 252.
2 [1896] 2 Q.B. 283.
3 Supra, footnote (1) at 152; 253.
4 Supra, footnote (2) at 286.
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Case Comment
Before searching for an authority to support Mr. Justice Roach's
statement, none being cited in the judgment, the facts in Canada Trust
Co. v. Labadie should be summarily stated. Here the donor made
three promissory notes of which he was the payee, payable to the
donee by the endorsement "if anything happens causing my death this
note is to be paid to [the donee] ". Although possession of those notes
was given to the donee, the donor continued to receive the payments
and interest on the notes until his death, about seven months after
endorsing the last note. It was established that the donor had a
chronic heart ailment which caused him some "apprehension" but
he tended his business up to his death in his normal fashion. Mr.
Justice Roach held this to be nothing but a vain attempt to make a
testamentary gift and an invalid donatio mortis causa for the reason
stated above.
Where did the requirement of "in extremis" come from? In
an earlier donatio case, Thomas v. Mechan,5 Roach, J.A., approved
and applied Cain v. Moon6 but he made this statement as well:
In English Law, a donatio mortis causa is only valid when made in
contemplation of death from a cause that is proximate, either an existing
or immediately impending peril, placing the donor in extremis.7
There is yet another step to be taken. In aid of the "in extremis"
requirement, Roach, J.A. appears to have relied upon Hedges 'v.
Hedgess decided in 1708, where Cowper, C., in listing the require-
ments of a valid donatio stated:
... where a man lies in extremity or being surprised with sickness and
not having an opportunity to make a will ...
Perhaps this case, cited in Thomas v. Mechan1° is the basis of the
decision in Canada Trust Co. v. Labadie.
One must agree with Mr. Justice Roach in Thomas v. Mechan'1
where he states that the necessary contemplation "will not be sat-
isfied by a vague and general impression that death may occur from
one of the ordinary risks that attend human affairs". Certainly, it
could equally be stated that attending to one's business in a normal
manner, albeit with a chronic heart ailment, would seldom have
the necessary "contemplative" state of mind required for a valid
donatio mortis causa. That the donor be in extremis to effect a valid
donatio would seem to be a strict requirement indeed, and, it is sub-
mitted, unnecessary for the decision. Perhaps the in extremis basis
will be disregarded in future, as there was an alternate basis for the
decision, namely, that the donor reserved substantial control of the
notes.
5 (1958] O.R. 357.
6 Supra, footnote (2).
7 Supra, footnote (5) at 364.
8 (1708) Pr. CL. 269.
9Ibid.
10 Supra, footnote (5).
1Ibid.
1963]
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Nevertheless, it would now appear that a judge on the High
Court has three guides or choices when next confronted with a donatio
mortis causa situation. He can follow Cain v. Moon 2 expressly
adopted in Eppen v. Szczepkowski 13 by Mr. Justice Roach; or he can
follow the hybrid requirement found in Thomas v. Mechan;14 or, if
desired, he can require the donor to be in extremis relying upon
Mr. Justice Roach's latest decision, Canada Trust Co. v. Labadie.15
CAM HARVEY"
ROSS-SMITH VS. ROsS-SMIT-CONFLICT OF LAWS-ANNULMENT-
JURISDICON-VOm AND VOIDABLE MARRIAGES-Recently the majority
of the House of Lords in Ross-Smith v. Ross-Smith' held that the
fact that a marriage is celebrated in England does not confer juris-
diction on an English court in nullity actions, if the marriage is
voidable and the respondent is neither domiciled nor resident in
England.
In the Ross-Smith case the petitioner-wife was resident in Eng-
land, the husband being domiciled in Scotland and resident in the
Middle East The wife prayed for annulment on the ground of non-
consummation owing to either the impotence or wilful refusal of the
appellant husband. At trial2 Karminski, J., stated that there was a
distinction between void and voidable marriages as regards juris-
diction and following Casey v. Casey3 he held that the place of cele-
bration was not sufficient to found jurisdiction in an action for annul-
ment of a voidable marriage. The Court of Appeal4 reversed this
decision on the ground that Simonin v. Maflac5 (a void marriage
situation) held that the court had jurisdiction on the sole ground
that the marriage was celebrated in England; and there being no
distinction between a void and voidable marriage for jurisdictional
purposes, the rule in Simonin v. Mallac applied:
The question of jurisdiction of the English court was fully argued and
it was held by the full court that jurisdiction existed on the ground that
the marriage had been celebrated in England . . . the decision has
stood for 100 years and, though freqently cited, has never been questioned.
It (Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax)6 decided once and for all that
no distinction is to be drawn, for jurisdictional purposes, between mar-
riages void ab initio and those which are merely voidable.... The
decision in Ramsay-Fairfax v. Ramsay-Fairfax is to be preferred and
is to be followed.7
12 Supra, footnote (2).
13 [1945] O.R. 540.
14 Supra, footnote (5).
35 upra, footnote (1).
*Mr. Harvey is in second year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [1962] 1 All E.R. 344.
2 [1960] 3 All E.R. 70.
3 [1949] 2 All E.R. 110.
4 [1961] 1 All E.R. 255.
5 (1860), 2 Sw & Tr. 67.
6 [1955] 2 All E.R 709.
7 Per Wilmer L. J., supra, footnote 4 at p. 260.
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